(? 311).
This claim is interesting not because there is any truth in it, but precisely because it is so far off the mark that the question arises what made it possible for Berkeley to read Plato and Aristotle through the distorting lens of his own philosophy. That Berkeley misread certain texts is plain enough. But in explaining this I shall be aiming at larger questions about the whole climate of thought which encouraged or allowed the anachronistic misreading. For it was not due to a lack of scholarship or knowledge. Berkeley was extremely well versed in Greek philosophy, -and Sins displays an enviable command of a wide range of the original texts. I shall argue, however, that none of those texts displays the leanings towards idealism which Berkeley thought he saw in them. Idealism, whether we mean by that Berkeley's own doctrine that esse est percipi or a more vaguely conceived thesis to the effect that everything is in some substantial sense mental or spiritual, is one of the very few major philosophical positions absurdities, culminating in a proof (1 79c-1 83c) that if the theory were correct it would make language impossible.
Thus the structure of the argument is that of a reductio ad absurdum. The theorizing which attracted Berkeley represents not Plato's belief, but his spelling out of the meaning and presuppositions of the initial thesis that knowledge is perception.2 The theory cannot give Plato's own view of perception and the sensible world if he thinks he has a good argument to show that it 2 One reason Berkeley missed this is that he translated Theaetetus' definition as "Sense is science," taking the thesis of Theaetetus and Protagoras to be that sense alone suffices for knowing (understanding) the connections Failure to grasp that the argument is an extended reductio ad absurdum and that the theory of perception is not presented as Platonic doctrine is equally characteristic of modern commentators on the Theaetetus-although they have not Berkeley's excuse of mistranslation to disassociate the definition from the theory which supports it. This is not the place for elaborate exegesis or scholarly controversy, but the case for the reading I present can be summarily set out in three stages, as follows.
(A) We first go through the text picking out the main stage-directions, as it were, by which Plato indicates how, in his view, the three theses under discussion (Theaetetus, Protagoras, Heraclitus) are related. This is best done in abstracto, without delving into the content of the theses themselves.
Most important, because centrally and emphatically placed at a turning point in the discussion, is 160de: the three theses "come to the same thing" makes language impossible. Indeed, the dialogue makes a point of emphasizing (182e) that the theory is itself a bit of language, so that if it were correct it could not even be coherently stated.
listed shows that there is a difference of status between the two halves of the equivalence we began from.
It is thought to be reasonably clear that Consequently it remains an abstract possibility at the end that Theaetetus might find some alternative to (2) to avoid the reductio-a possibility which is, however, foreclosed by the direct refutation of the definition which follows at 184b-187a. In sum, the Protagorean-Heraclitean theory states a complete set of sufficient conditions for Theaetetus' definition to hold good, which conditions, it is argued, are (i) necessary conditions for it, (ii) harbingers of absurdity and hence, in the end, its downfall.
(B) If commentators have almost to a man been unwilling to take at face value these manifold indications by Plato as to the intended structure of his argument (and there are many lesser confirmatory signs which I have not mentioned), that is because they have not seen the underlying philosophical connections which make (2) intelligible and plausible. So the next task is to outline the connections in a manner which will enable us to take Plato at his word: see text below (it turns out that on this aspect Berkeley's philosophical acumen scores better).
(C) Even so, even supposing that the account I shall sketch is found satisfactory, one major stumbling block will remain. To carry through the reductio it is necessary to remove the impression many readers have formed ( is a different and more extreme Heraclitean theory than that elaborated in the earlier section to 160e. The answer here is that Plato furnishes an argument (181de) to show that there is no escaping the further developments which are to be the theory's undoing. And here too an appreciation of the underlying connections between the three theses is indispensable. For, unlike most commentators, I believe that this argument is to be taken seriously. But that is a large project which I must leave to another occasion. Our present need is to understand the theory, not destroy it.
7
But if Plato did not himself assent to the doctrine which Berkeley (not unfairly) formulates as a denial of "an absolute actual existence of sensible or corporeal things," it is reasonably certain that no one else did either. The elements of the theory come from Protagoras and Heraclitus, but there is every reason to doubt that either of these thinkers pushed the consequences of his views as far as Plato did. So, if there is a version of idealism to be discerned in the Theaetetus-and certainly, no other ancient text comes as near to Berkeley's position-it is not an idealism that any Greek thinker ever propounded as his own. It is a dialectical construction, which anticipates idealism only to show that it would entail the impossibility of language and other absurdities.
But is the Theaetetus theory a version of idealism? Do its resemblances with Berkeley, which are undeniable, include a resemblance in respect of the features which rank Berkeley as our first and foremost idealist? I take it that if the label "idealism" is of any historical use at all, it indicates a form of monism: monism not about the number of things in existence but about the number of kinds of things. Just as materialism is the monism which asserts that ultimately nothing exists or is real but matter and material things, so idealism is the monism which claims that ultimately all there is is mind and the contents of mind. But it is just this monistic tendency which is absent from the Theaetetus. To explain this I need to divulge some more details of Plato's dialectical construction.
The central contribution of Protagoras to the theory elaborated in the Theaetetus is the rule that whatever sensible appearances a person has, they are true for him-things really are, for him, as they appear to him to be-together with the converse rule that the only things that are real for him are those that appear to him. This is the content Plato gives to Protagoras' famous proclamation, "Man is the measure of all things, of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not." The rule demands a state of affairs for every appearance, rendering that appearance true, and the converse rule demands for every state of affairs an appearance in which that state of affairs is perceived or known. Thus a thing appears white to me if and only if there 8 obtains the state of affairs, its being white for me.3 If the rule and its converse are correct, Theaetetus' definition is so far vindicated. Once perception is construed in Protagorean terms as the having of sensible appearances (152b 9-c 2), every perception will be the unerring apprehension of a particular state of affairs, and there will be no state of affairs which is not unerringly apprehended in perception. Thus all perception is knowledge, and all knowledge is perception. 'That all perception is knowledge is explicitly and validly argued at 152ac from the rule that every appearance is true for the person who has it and the premise that perception is the same as having an appearance. That all knowledge is perception is not explicitly argued there, but it can be derived by application of the converse rule and it needs to be derived if Socrates is to prove that the whole equation of knowledge and perception follows from Protagoras' philosophy. The reason for Plato's silence here about the latter half of the package is, I think, the following: it is only where sensible qualities are concerned that one would venture to equate the having of appearances with perception-Socrates says as much at 152c 1-2-and Plato wants later (161b ff.) to discuss Protagorean relativism in its most general form, as the view that things are for each person as they appear to him, whether the "appearing" is appearing to sense or to thought. The completely general relativism will preserve the thesis that all perception is knowledge, while allowing for knowledge (veridical appearance) that is not perception. There is more to be said on this aspect (for some of it, see paper cited in the preceding note), but for present purposes it will be enough to amend our previous overall description of the argument: it is a reductio ad absurdum with asides, namely, those asides which treat of Protagorean relativism in a more general form than is required for sustaining Theaetetus' definition. That said, we can from now on confine attention to sensible appearances and to one half of Theaetetus and Protagoras: the thesis that all perception is knowledge and the rule that, whatever sensible appearances a person has, they are true for him. 9 present time. The reason why this must be so is that, notoriously, appearances vary and conflict, and if they are all to be true for the person who has them, as the Protagorean rule prescribes, the states of affairs which make them true must vary to match. Similar considerations apply in Berkeley's theory, for his notion of immediate perception embodies a version of the Protagorean rule: immediate perception for Berkeley is knowledge (Three Dialogues 206, 238);5 what is perceived must really be as it appears to be (Dial. 238); hence what is perceived must alter with every variation in the sensible appearances. The argument which yields this result is simple and compelling.
The same wind cannot be simultaneously both cold and not cold, to use Plato's example, or in Berkeley's version of the identical argument, the same water cannot be simultaneously both cold and warm (Dial. 178-79, 189). Hence, if every appearance is to be vindicated as true, as genuine knowledge, there will be a contradiction when appearances conflict, unless what is the case for the person or the hand that feels warm and what is the case for the one that feels cold constitute distinct and independent states of affairs. In Berkeleyan terms two distinct ideas are perceived, two momentary appearances which really do exhibit the qualities they seem to have; in Protagorean terms each perception confronts its own private instantiation of a sensible quality; and neither theory can allow that the same wind or the same water enters into both occurrences. And if this holds when the conflicting appearances are contemporaneous, it holds also when they come successively in the experience of one individual. Here too we need distinct states of affairs to match the appearances (for Berkeley, distinct ideas), and we must deny that the wind or the water maintains its identity through time to occur in both. Such, in outline, are the underlying philosophical connections between the three theses on which the Theaetetus theory is built. It all sounds remarkably like Berkeley, not only in content but also in the argument which motivates and controls the construction. The difference is that in the Theaetetus it is as true to say that the perceiving subject is dependent on there being something for it to perceive as it is to say that the thing perceived is dependent on a subject perceiving it. The ontological dependence goes both ways. The clearest evidence of this is the very passage that Berkeley relies on in Siris when he claims, in the section I quoted, that Plato does not admit "an absolute actual existence of sensible or corporeal things." Socrates is summing up the Protagorean-Heraclitean construction he has elaborated in support of Theaetetus' definition: Whenever I come to be perceiving, I necessarily come to be perceiving something; because it's impossible to come to be perceiving, but not perceiving anything. And whenever it [sc., the object perceived] comes to be sweet, bitter, or anything of that kind, it necessarily comes to be so for someone; because it's impossible to come to be sweet, but not sweet for anyone ... Then what we're left with, I think, is that it's for each other we [sc., subject and object] are, if we are, or come to be, if we come to be, since necessity ties our being together, but doesn't tie it to anything else, or indeed to ourselves. So what we're left with is that we're tied to each other. It follows that, whether one uses 'be' or 'come to be'8 of something, one should speak of it as being, or coming to be, for someone or of something or in relation to something. As for speaking of a thing as being or coming to be anything just by itself, one shouldn't do that oneself, and one shouldn't accept it from anyone else either. That Now perception is passive in the Theaetetus also, but the causally active element is the thing perceived (159c). In truth, this is hardly a serious causal claim. The active item being just a momentary occurrence, it can be said to be active only in relation to the subject which perceives it here and now (157a, 160a). It has the power to stimulate a sense-organ or subject just once: it is active in relation to the equally momentary sense-organ or subject by which alone it is perceived and which perceives it alone (159e-160b). This activity is nothing but a last etiolated remnant of our ordinary assumptions about the causal role of physical objects in perception, left over when these have been whittled down to a series of distinct momentary occurrences. Plato's dialectical construction is not seriously concerned with the causal aspect of perception. Nor does he trouble to explain, what for Berkeley is a major theme, how it comes about that there is always a state of affairs to match any given appearance. He has no equivalent to Berkeley's divine agency. And his indifference to the issue of causality itself illustrates his lack of concern to award ontological primacy to one side or the other. For his dialectical purpose he can continue to work with the ordinary dualism of perceiving minds and physical objects perceived. The whittled-down physical objects have indeed no "absolute actual existence"-they exist only for the subjects which perceive thembut they are not mental things: they are not made to exist by a 13 mind, and consequently do not exist in a mind in the sense which makes Berkeley's a monistic philosophy."' Conversely, minds in the Theaetetus have no absolute actual existence either, something Berkeley could certainly not allow. There is no continuing subject of perception, any more than a continuing object of perception, but only a series of distinct subjects existing momentarily as, for example, the subject or the sense-organ which sees that white thing now.'2 One might sum up the difference this way: where Berkeley insists that for sensible things esse is strictly identical with percipi, Plato says simply that a sensible item est if and only if percipitur, and he leaves it at that. The etiolated remnants of the two realms of mind and matter are tied together by necessity, but they remain two, not one.
II
We have now explored in some detail Berkeley's best evidence for an ancient Greek idealism, and we have found it wanting. There is little need to dwell on Berkeley's attempt to claim a similar position for Aristotle. Berkeley quotes Aristotle as saying, "Sensible things, although they receive no change in themselves, do nevertheless in sick persons produce different sensations and not the same" (Met. 1063a37-b4), and he admits that such passages "would seem to imply a distinct and absolute existence of Of course, having got thus far it is only a short step, as Russell found, to abolishing the subject-object distinction altogether. But the point is that the step is not taken in the Theaetetus. In any case, if one detects an idealist slant in the ostensibly neutral monism of modem philosophers who have pushed further, that has a lot to do with one's knowledge that, historically, the monism is reached by way of Berkeley and presupposes Berkeley's elimination of matter. It is Berkeley's previous elimination of matter which ensured that, when Hume cut out Berkeley's substantial mind, all he could be left with was perceptions. 14 the objects of sense" (? 311). So they do, but Berkeley counters that the existence of sensible things when not perceived is for Aristotle merely potential, not actual (? 312). Here he has simply misunderstood Aristotle's doctrine that sensible qualities become actualized in perception. It is not the thesis that an apple is not actually or really red except when it is seen, but that it does not look red. The apple becomes actually red when it ripens; what is actualized in perception is not the redness but the capacity of that redness to act on or manifest itself to sight. 3 Further, even if the sensible qualities of the apple were merely potential, the apple itself in the Aristotelian scheme of things is not to be identified with the sum of its sensible qualities. It is a substantial entity in its own right,'4 which is to say that it enjoys exactly that absolute actual existence which Berkeley is so anxious to deny.
But if both Plato and Aristotle refuse to enlist in the idealist cause, who remains? Various names might be suggested. Parmenides? But the fragment (frag. 3) which was once believed, by Berkeley among others (Siris ? 309), to say that to think and to be are one and the same is rather to be construed as saying, on the contrary, that it is one and the same thing which is there for us to think of and is there to be: thought requires an object, distinct from itself, and that object, Parmenides argues, must actually 13 See De Anima II 5 and III 2. Berkeley overlooks Aristotle's central claim (418a 3-6) that the sensible object must already be in actuality what, prior to the act of perception, the sentient subject is potentially. If the red apple's redness is a potentiality as well as an actuality, this is a second potentiality, on a par with the potential knowledge of a man who has actually learned something but is not currently using his knowledge, not with the potentiality which precedes the learning. Berkeley also draws on Aristotle's doctrine that actual knowledge and the thing known are one: "Whence it follows that the things are where the knowledge is, that is to say, in the mind" (Siris ? 310). Aristotle's own conclusion is, of course, not that at all: "It is not the stone which is in the soul but its form" (De An. 431b 29-a 1). At Met. 1010b 30-35 (which Berkeley should have seized on) the aisthita that are conceded to depend for their existence on being perceived must be actualized sensible qualities (so Christopher Kirwan, Aristotle's Metaphysics F, A, E (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), ad loc.), or else Aristotle will be slipping into the Megarian account of possibility which he disputes on this very issue in Met. 0 3.
14 In stricter moods Aristotle would not allow that an apple, as opposed to an apple tree, is a proper substance. But this hardly affects the issue, and I choose the example as being Berkeley's own (Princ. ? 1). 15 exist. Gorgias? Gorgias argued that nothing exists, that if anything did exist we could have no knowledge of it, and that even if we did have knowledge of it we could not communicate that knowledge to anyone else. But to argue that nothing exists at all is presumably not to take an idealist stance, and in any case what Gorgias was serious about was not his outrageous conclusions but the demonstration that he could impose them on you by argumentative persuasions which you will be helpless to resist. Metrodorus of Chios? Metrodorus was a skeptically inclined follower of Democritus who is credited with the obscure pronouncement, "Everything exists that one might think of" (frag. 2). But an atomist, whatever else he may be, is at least some sort of materialist, not an idealist, and the obscure remark may rather be a version of the atomist doctrine that all possibilities are sooner or later realized somewhere in the universe. This would tie in with an argument that Metrodorus is reported to have used to establish the existence of an infinite number of worlds: it is as absurd that just one world should come to be in the infinite as that just one ear of corn should grow on a large plain. 15 Perhaps, then, the Neoplatonists? They have been classified as idealists because they hold that the world proceeds from Intellect (Nous) and Soul. The problem is that whether this is in any interesting sense an idealist view depends on how the cosmic creation is conceived, and about that, as about so much else, Plotinus and his successors are notoriously obscure. Berkeley was content to cite evidence that "the Platonists" believe that all nature is alive, and is made and governed by an eternal mind."6 But that is hardly enough. Even if it can be said that in Neoplatonism the real, insofar as it is real, is in some sense spiritual, 17 it remains that matter is not. What is most revealing about Neoplatonism is that the cosmic creation (a permanent, not a temporal process) is still conceived in the old Greek way as the operation of a formal principle on matter. Matter for Plotinus is indeed not corporeal (Enneads II 4. 12. 34-38), for it is without any determination at all: it is the sheer negativity of not being, potentiality without a trace of actuality, darkness or privation, evil (11 4, II 5, I 8). But Plotinus is emphatic that this does not mean it is an empty name (II 4. 12. 23-24). One arrives at the notion of matter by stripping away all determinations, including extension, and what is left at the limit of analysis is the concept of that which is other than all actual determinate being (II 4. 13. 27-32). The Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation has it that through a series of stages this "other" is endowed with reality and form in the manner in which darkness is illuminated by light. If it can be said that matter, too, is initially made by Soul, this is in consequence of, and not identical with, the imposition of form. It is actual determinate being which is the product of emanation; the making of matter is rather to be compared to the way a beam of light marks out the darkness below as what is other than itself, as that which it illuminates and informs (I 8. 7. 17-24, II 4. 5). The old doctrine that everything in the world is a combination of matter and form still holds, though it has been complicated and reinterpreted in novel ways (II 4. 6, II 4. 10. 23-25). It seems, therefore, that the grand cosmic metaphor of emanation is evidence less of incipient idealism in a modern sense than of the ancients' final inability to relinquish the traditional dualities of mind and object, subject and attribute. In fact, while it is not surprising that Berkeley should approve the denial that matter is corporeal (Siris ?? 306, 317-18), he is only able to embrace the full Neoplatonic doctrine that matter is not being, 18 the darkness illumined by form (Sims ?? 318-20), by a striking relaxation of his own earlier contention that there is no nonmental "other" to mind because the notion of matter is just a confused fiction concocted by philosophers.'9 18 ontos ouk on (II 5. 5. 25), to be contrasted with that which is not at all (to pantilpanteles me on, VI 9. 11. 36-38). A full treatment of Neoplatonic "idealism" would have to grapple with the further difficulty that Intellect and Soul themselves proceed from an ineffable first principle, the One. It is possible that the One does in some obscure and unfamiliar sense have knowledge of itself.20 The interpretation is not uncontroversial, but supposing it to be well-founded, the motivation would probably be that it is only in an absolutely unitary and hence unitarily self-knowing first principle that the traditional duality of subject and object can be finally and completely overcome. But this means, first, that some form of duality remains at every other level; and second, that since both Intellect and its eternal intelligible objects (the Forms, which are different, yet not separate, from Intellect: III 9. 1) disappear together into the One, it would be misleading and partial to describe the ultimate monism as a monism of mind. Even less is it a monism of mind if the controversially anthropomorphic interpretation of the One is set aside. So our quarry is not to be found in Plotinus. 2 As for the 800-odd years of Greek philosophy before Neoplatonism took overand it is to this more congenial period that my generalizations will now be addressed-throughout that time thought and theory are dominated by an unquestioned, unquestioning assumption of realism.
Greek philosophy is perfectly prepared to think that reality may be entirely different from what we ordinarily take it to be. atoms and void, a world without any of the secondary qualities familiar to subjective experience. It may be, finally, that we simply know nothing of what reality is like, as various skeptics urge. But all these philosophers, however radical their scrutiny of ordinary belief, leave untouched-indeed, they rely upon-the notion that we are deceived or ignorant about something. There is a reality of some sort confronting us; we are in touch with something, even if this something, reality, is not at all what we think it to be. 22 Greek philosophy does not know the problem of proving in a general way the existence of an external world. That problem is a modern invention, and the process by which it was invented will be highly germane to our enquiry later on. The problem which typifies ancient philosophical enquiry in a way that the external world problem has come to typify philosophical enquiry in modern times is quite the opposite. It is the problem of understanding how thought can be of nothing or what is not, how our minds can be exercised on falsehoods, fictions, and illusions. The characteristic worry, from Parmenides onwards, is not how the mind can be in touch with anything at all, but how it can fail to be. And I think that in this contrast there is much to be learned about the differences between ancient and modern philosophy.
For one thing, it means that the monism which comes most naturally to a Greek philosopher is materialism, as in the Stoics A simple solution will circumvent the difficulty: keep toi as "wherefore" and take the subject of the verb from to eon in the previous line (construction as in frag. 9, 1): "Wherefore it (the one being) is named all the names which mortals have laid down in the (mistaken) belief that they are true (of it)." On this construal mortals continue to talk about something, viz., the only thing there is to talk about, but what they say about it is wrong and contradictory. 19 or, very differently and provided that an infinite void does not count as an extra item in one's ontology, Democritean and Epicurean atomism. These philosophies reduce mind to matter with a robust paucity of argument which ought to strike the historian as revealingly naive. Whereas, I suggest, a monism leaning in the other direction, from reality to mind, would be repellent to Greek thought, for it would seem to deprive the mind of the objects it must necessarily have. This inbuilt assumption of realism is well illustrated by a curious passage in Plato's Parmenides (132bc).
In reply to the famous Third Man Argument against the Platonic Theory of Forms, Socrates makes the suggestion that the Forms are thoughts. This would mean, he says, that a Form could not subsist anywhere but in souls, and in that way each Form would be one and would not suffer the damaging reduplication which the Third Man Argument brought about. To understand this suggestion we need to remember that Plato's Forms, at least in the context of the arguments in the Parmenides, are entities which explain how it is that a number of things are, for example, large. Socrates' answer so far has been that large things all participate in the Form, the Large Itself, which is an independent entity grasped by reasoning rather than by perception (cf. 129a-130a). But this answer has led to various absurdities, the last and most serious of which-the Third Man objection-was that the very reasoning which favors the postulation of a single Form, the Large Itself, further gives rise to an infinite number of Forms for the things that are large; and this wrecks the hypothesis, on which the explanatory force of the theory depends, that there is just one Form for each set of things falling under the common term in question. Socrates' escape from the difficulty, as I understand it, involves the suggestion that in a certain sense there is no independently existing entity, the Form, at all, and hence nothing that could turn out to be many instead of one. Large things are large, not because they all have a relationship to a further entity, the Form, but because they are all related, in some way as yet unspecified, to a certain thought. That thought, therefore, is the Form which explains how it is that all of them are large. Now, given that the purpose of the Theory of Forms is to explain how it is that things in the world have the characters they 20 do, it might seem that the proposal to construe Forms as thoughts, subsisting only in souls or minds, was a move toward a form of idealism different from the Berkeleyan kind we have chiefly considered so far. The idealism which has been most influential in modern times is the idealism which asserts, in one version or another, that the world is essentially structured by the categories of our thought. And it might well seem that some such dependence of the characters of things on thought was the solution Socrates has proposed to escape the difficulties he encountered with his earlier, heavily realist mode of explanation.
But consider how the argument develops. Parmenides asks, "Is each of the thoughts one and yet a thought of nothing?" "Impossible," replies Socrates. "So it is a thought of something?" "Yes." "Of something that is or of something that is not?" "Of something that is." "Of some one thing which, being over all the cases, that thought thinks, i.e., some single character?" "Yes." "Then won't this thing, which is thought to be one [or: this one object of thought] and which is always the same over all the cases, be a Form?" "That again seems to follow." Thus Socrates is driven back to his original realism. Thought must have an object, a really existing object independent of itself, and that object will be the Form.
What is remarkable about this argument is its swiftness and the brutality of its realism. Plato is certainly capable of more sophisticated treatment of the relation of thought to its objects. Here he is indulging an Eleatic theme which he knows very well needs careful scrutiny lest it trap one in intolerable paradox. But the very fact that he allows his Eleatic spokesman to get away with it reveals, I think, that it simply did not occur to him that there might be a serious philosophical thesis to be developed out of Socrates' suggestion that Forms are thoughts. We are confronted with the spectacle of the most audacious and creative philosophical imagination of antiquity (witness, to take just one example, the anticipatory refutation of Berkeley in the Theaetetus) unable to entertain seriously the idea that one might seek to explain the nature of the world by reference to the categories of our thought. He is unable to do so because, whatever his scruples about the Eleatic principle that there is no thinking of what is 21 not, he cannot see past the idea that thought must be of something independent of itself.23 Thought is relative, essentially of something else, and therefore it is incapable of furnishing the ultimate explanation of anything.
It 24 The important point for our purpose is that Plato is concerned with the explanatory, not just the classificatory function of Forms. And Hellenistic conceptualism would agree with him that it would be reversing the natural order of things to explain the world by the categories of our thought.
III
In these last remarks I have strayed into talking about developments in Hellenistic philosophy, and it is now time to move on to the later period and pick up the question I touched on earlier, why the Greeks never posed the problem of the existence of an external world in the general form we have known it since Descartes. This is the period in which to look for an answer to that question, because it was then that the arguments from conflicting appearances which we discussed in connection with Berkeley and the Theaetetus were worked up into a systematic skepticism. circumstances and of the conflicting appearances to which they give rise. Faced with this conflict of appearances, the skeptic agrees with Berkeley and the Theaetetus that conflicting appearances cannot be equally true of a common objective world, cannot be equally representative of how things really are in themselves. Unlike Berkeley and the Theaetetus, however, the skeptic has no prior commitment to the thesis that perception or appearance is knowledge. So he does not accept both of a pair of conflicting appearances and then adjust his picture of the world to match. Rather, he holds on to the ordinary conception of a common objective world and looks for a criterion of truth to determine which of the conflicting appearances he should accept. Unfortunately, there turns out to be no intellectually satisfactory criterion he can trust and use. We have no adequate way of telling when things really are as they appear to be. The skeptic now finds himself in the following position: he cannot accept all the appearances, because they conflict, and he cannot decide between them, for lack of a criterion or any reasoned basis for preferring one to another. Hence he cannot accept any. He is forced to suspend judgment. Just try to believe something is true which you are fully aware that you have absolutely no reason to prefer to its denial; for instance, to take the favorite example, that the number of the stars is even. Pyrrhonian skepticism leaves you that way as regards every question whatsoever.
The legacy of Protagoras and Heraclitus was a battery of arguments tending to show that

You may think this an uncomfortable position to end up in. But the skeptic does not find it so. The great recommendation of Pyrrhonism is that suspension of judgment on all questions as to what is true and what is false results in tranquillity. Anxiety is due either to certainty or to uncertainty. Either one holds firm beliefs-value beliefs about what is important and worthwhile
and factual beliefs about states of affairs in the world which bear on one's pursuit or preservation of these goods-and then one is afflicted with hopes and fears for one's present and future happiness; or, alternatively, one is made anxious by being uncertain whether one has the right beliefs about these things. The skeptic, we are told (PH 1 12, 26-29), sets out on his enquiries in the hope of freeing himself from the anxieties of uncertainty. And he does get free of them-but in a manner different from that which he aimed for. He resolves his uncertainty, not by 24 finding answers to his questions (which would only be to swap one source of anxiety for another), but by finding that they seem to be unanswerable. It is when he throws in the sponge that, unexpectedly, tranquillity ensues; just as, to use Sextus' own comparison, the famous painter Apelles only achieved the effect of showing the foam at a horse's mouth when he gave up trying and flung his sponge at the painting.
We may find this an unattractive solution to the problems of life. But we must recognize that Pyrrhonian skepticism had this in common with the rival Hellenistic philosophies, Stoicism and Epicureanism, that it offered in all seriousness a recipe for happiness. And it will become clear, I hope, that this practical orientation is of the first importance for the problem of the existence of the external world.26 It goes without saying that a recipe for happiness is addressed to people who can live in the world and enjoy their happiness. I must now show that it did go without saying. not dispute that certain things customarily appear good or bad to him; he notes that certain arguments appear to lead to a skeptical conclusion; and so it goes for any subject you like to bring up. The skeptic finds himself assenting to a host of propositions of the form "Such and such appears to me now thus and so," but he never finds reason to advance to the truth claim "It is as it appears." There is thus a large class of statements which, as Sextus puts it (PH I 22), are immune from enquiry (azititos). They are immune from enquiry, not open to dispute, because they make no claim as to objective fact. They simply record the skeptic's own present experience, the way he is affected (in Greek, his pathos), leaving it open whether external things really are as they appear to him to be.
Sextus claims to suspend judgment about everything, but on examination we find that the scope of this "everything" does not extend to everything that we-that is, post-Cartesian we-would
That is the first limitation on the scope of Pyrrhonian skepticism, expressed in Sextus' own terms. The modern, post-Cartesian reader may feel that Sextus is somewhat disingenuous in offering this elucidation of what it is to suspend judgment about everything. But that would, I think, be a mistake. It would be a mistake for the same reason that it would be a mistake-though again a mistake that comes naturally to a post-Cartesian philosopher-to object that the skeptic has left himself some truth after all, namely, all those truths about his experience which he records in statements of the form "It appears to me thus and so." Surely, one wants to say, a statement of this form is true if and only if things do appear as the statement says they appear.27 But as I have already noted, in the skeptic's book to say that an appearance, or the statement expressing it, is true is to say that external things really are as they (are said to) appear to be. "True" in these discussions always means "true of a real objective world," and that is how the word "true" had been used since Protagoras and before. Protagoras' book was called Truth precisely because it offered an account of the conditions under which things really are as they appear to be. The Greek use of the predicates "true" and "false" embodies the assumption of realism on which I have been insisting all along. The correct response to this historical fact is not to object, but to ask for enlightenment: how did it come about that philosophy accepted the idea that truth can be obtained without going outside subjective experience?
That question posed, let us turn to some of the limitations on which Sextus is less explicit. Never, for example, does he claim that the skeptic can be certain of "appearing"-statements or that he knows his own experiences. 28 He does not, like some modern philosophers of a skeptical turn, say, "At least I know how things appear to me, but do I know any more than that?" And there is evidence in Galen that if the question was raised-and it is not clear that it was often raised-then at least the more radical Pyrrhonists (rustic Pyrrhonists, Galen calls them) would actually deny that they had certain knowledge of appearances.29
It would be appropriate at this point to move a second request for enlightenment: when and why did philosophers first lay claim to knowledge of their own subjective states? But there is a complication. An earlier group of skeptics, the Cyrenaic school, did hold that we know our own experience (pathos) and nothing else. They put it in these terms: I know how I am being affected, but not what causes me to be thus affected. I can say, for example, "I am being burned" or "I am being cut," but not that it is fire that is burning or iron that is cutting me. 30 If these examples are mystifying to a modern ear, it is not just for lack of the information that cutting and cauterizing were two main operations of ancient surgery.31 What one wants to ask is whether they mean the physical event of cauterizing or the way it feels. But to that question no answer is forthcoming.
Consider also the special vocabulary which the Cyrenaics devised to express their perceptual experiences. 32 yellow and taste something sweet, or of something's appearing yellow, sweet, etc., the Cyrenaic prefers to say, "I am yellowed, sweetened, etc." The argument then is that if I am "yellowed," this does not guarantee that my yellowish state is due to something yellow outside me. I may have jaundice, which makes the eyes go yellow so that everything looks yellow. " But now which of these, the yellowing of the eyes or the looking yellow, is the primary reference of the perceptual report "I am yellowed"? Once again, there is no clear answer. Moreover, there would be reason not to expect an answer if, as seems very possible, the Cyrenaic vocabulary derives from a skeptical reading of Aristotle's theory that to perceive yellow is to acquire the form which the object already has.34 For the ambiguity of this theory is precisely that it is unclear, and is still a matter of exegetical dispute, how literally (physically) Aristotle means to say that some part of me becomes yellow when I perceive yellow.35 But with or without this Aristotelian connection, it looks to be anachronistic to think we must be able to "split" the Cyrenaic notion of experience into separate mental (subjective) and physical (objective) components. So far as I can discover, the first philosopher who picks out as something we know what are unambiguously subjective states, and picks them out as giving certain knowledge because they are subjective states, is Augustine (Contra Academicos III 26), in this as in other things a precursor of Descartes. It is clear that Augustine means to speak of subjective states, first because he uses verbs of appearance ("This appears white," "This tastes sweet," etc.), and second (in case anyone thinks to worry about a subjective reference for the demonstrative "this") because he has just invented the idea that we might designate as "the world" the totality of appearances, including the "as if" earth (quasi terra) and the "as if" sky which contains them (III 24). 36 34 Cf. n. 13 above. The suggested derivation is due to Keith McCullough. 3 E.g., De An. 425b 22-24: "That which sees has in a certain way become coloured; for in each case the sense organ is capable of receiving the sensible object without its matter." 36 The significance of this innovation of Augustine's as a step towards a Cartesian conception of the mind is well brought out by Gareth B. Matthews in a paper offering much that is relevant to our investigation: "Consciousness and Life," Philosophy, 52 (1977), 13-26. 28 thought of the claim to know items in this "world of appearance" not as a basis for skepticism, but as a novel way to refute the skeptical thesis that we have no knowledge of anything.
It is not very likely that the unclarity or ambiguity just noted in Cyrenaic skepticism is merely due to the poverty of our sources. For we find a parallel unclarity or ambiguity in Sextus' talk of external things. If we ask what these external things whose nature is in doubt are external to, it appears that no sharp line is drawn such as is presupposed in the modern formulation of the problem of the existence of the external world. In the modern formulation "external" means external to the mind, but in Sextus it means simply external to oneself, the cognitive subject, i.e., a man (cf. adv. Math. VII 167)-and the question is, "What does that come to?" Sextus can contrast the external thing with the bodily humors which affect one's perception of it (PH 1 102) or with the medium through which it is perceived (ib. 124-27), so it seems plain that the line is not drawn in Cartesian fashion between the mind and everything else outside it, including the skeptic's own body.
By the same token "external" in Sextus' use of it imports no Cartesian (Augustinian) break between things outside and an inner (subjective) world of things apparent. Ask Sextus what he means when he claims to suspend judgment about everything, and he will typically reply, "Well, take honey: it appears sweet to me but bitter to people with jaundice, and there is no criterion for deciding which it really is. Likewise the tower appears round from a distance and square from close by. And so on. That's how it is with everything." It is one and the same external thing, honey or the tower, which appears thus and so and which has a real nature that the skeptic is unable to determine. To express his skepticism Sextus continues to use the ordinary linguistic framework of reference to common objects; the familiar common objects stay on as the logical subjects of his "appearing"-statements. Recalling Parmenides, one might put it this way: the skeptic's thinking and speaking, no less than that of his dogmatic opponents, is of something, and something that is. Of course, the skeptic is not Parmenides, and when pressed he will suspend judgment about whether these things exist to be referred tobut he is not anxious to push that point to its logical conclusion, 29 still less to generalize it as far as doubting whether anything exists to speak and think of at all. And I do not know a single text in Sextus which treats the skeptic's own body as something external in the now familiar epistemological sense.
About the inside of human bodies, to be sure, Sextus is decidedly skeptical. Historically, Pyrrhonian skepticism had connections with certain skeptical movements in medicine.37 The Pyrrhonist arguments were used to oppose dogmatic trends in medicine which liked to theorize about the inner workings of the human body. But skepticism about one's insides hardly settles the status of one's body in the world at large. What does settle it is that Sextus is much exercised to combat an old objection to skepticism, an objection which goes back to the very beginnings of Greek skepticism and was to be important for Hume later: the objection, namely, that suspending judgment about everything must entail total inactivity and make life impossible.38 Not at all, replies Sextus. The skeptic will carry on acting like the rest of you, responding to the way things appear to him as nature and upbringing have conditioned him to respond. Now, whatever we may think of this rebuttal, it is not the language of a man afflicted with radical Cartesian doubt as to whether he has a body to act with and a world to act in at all. One's own body has not yet become for philosophy a part of the external world.39 So another question for the historian to ask is: when and why did that happen?
Meanwhile, I suggest that the reason it does not occur to the Pyrrhonian skeptic to push his doubt that far is that he is still, like any other Hellenistic philosopher, a man in search of happiness. He has a practical concern. His skepticism is a solution to uncertainty about how to act in the world; or better, a dissolution of that uncertainty. Such being his prime concern, he cannot doubt in a completely general way his ability to act in the world.
It is not that he affirms the world or the role of his body in it: these Cartesian questions lie apart from the route traveled by the skeptic's inquiry, just because he is so serious, in a practical sense, about his skepticism. In that sense Descartes was very clear that his skeptical doubt was not serious (see below). It was a strictly methodological affair-in Bernard Williams' phrase, "The Project of Pure Enquiry."40 And that was what enabled him to take the doubt far enough to raise in absolutely general terms the problem of the existence of the external world.
I take it to be significant in this connection that the only ancient text I have been able to find which approaches within reach of a really general doubt is not from Sextus but from an opponent of Pyrrhonism, pursuing a line of argument which is designed to be deeply embarrassing to the skeptic. It is an argument used by Galen to defend scientific medicine against his Pyrrhonist rivals.41 Galen formulates the Pyrrhonists' position as follows: about each of the things that appear they agree that it appears but they doubt, first, whether it really is as it appears, and second, whether it exists at all. By way of illustration we have a list of examples which is, I think, very much an opponent's list, designed to embarrass, not the sort of example which is typical in Sextus. Thus, Galen says, according to the Pyrrhonists we do not know whether there is a sun or a moon, or earth or sea, or whether we are awake or even whether we are thinking or living; indeed, there is nothing in the sum total of things the nature of which we know-and here, given the context, it is further implied that there is nothing in the sum total of things the existence of which we know. Is this the generalized doubt we have been looking It is Descartes' own hands and body which again occupy his attention when he moves on to level two, the Dream doubt (HR I 145-46). This goes back to Plato's Theaetetus (157e ff.), as Descartes was called upon to acknowledge (III Rep., HR II 60), but again Descartes makes a new and more radical use of it. In the Theaetetus the discussion remains at level one. The absence of a criterion for determining whether one is awake or dreaming supports only the conclusion that there is no rational basis for setting aside as false the impressions one has when dreaming, diseased, or insane. Every impression or appearance is true for the person who has it. Likewise in Sextus, dreams help to show that the way things appear cannot be taken as the criterion for how they really are (e.g., PH 1 104). The idea is that the credentials of dreams are no worse than those of waking experience. Descartes' conclusion from the same data is different and more general. It is that there is no rational basis for not setting aside as possibly false (suspending judgment about) any perceptual impression we ever have, including impressions of our own body. In other words, the credentials of (what we take to be) waking experience are no better than those of dreams. Possibly we have neither hands nor body such as we suppose we have. Any experience might be the illusion of a dream. This is already a strikingly modern radicalization of doubt, but we have still to reach level three and the possibility of an all-powerful, deceiving deity (HR 1 147 ff.), which Descartes himself characterized as a doubt additional to "the customary difficulties of the Sceptics." 48 Cicero's Academica reports a number of the arguments which Academic skeptics used against the Stoics' theory that ordinary perceptual experience does supply a perfectly good criterion of truth, namely what they call the cataleptic impression, an impression which, being clear and distinct, gives a certain grasp of its object. Among these arguments is the following (A cad. II 47). Some impressions, it is agreed, are sent by the deity, through dreams, oracles, omens, and the like, and some of these god-sent impressions are convincing but false. If, then, the deity has the power to make false impressions convincing to us, he must have the power, equally, to make convincing to us impressions which are not only false but such that they can hardly be distinguished from those which are true; and if these, then also impressions such that the true and the false are wholly indistinguishable from one another. The argument is that the deity could so arrange things that even in the best possible perceptual situation and applying the greatest care and To sum up, it is no accident that in Descartes' philosophy the following elements are found in the closest association: hyperbolical doubt and the problem of the existence of the external world, subjective knowledge and truth, the dualism which makes one's own body part of the external world-and the refutation of the ancient skeptical tradition. All these are substantially new with Descartes, and derive from the very seriousness (in one sense) with which he took the traditional skeptical materials. It is essential here that this seriousness is entirely methodological. Descartes several times associates his insistence on pushing doubt as far as it will go for the purposes of the project of Pure Enquiry with a firm rejection of the idea of trying to carry skepticism into the 
